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RETIREMENT POLICIES AND RELATED SOCIAL CHANGES 
IN THE LIFECYCLE 
 
RUSSELL K. OSGOOD* 
 
*** 
 
This Essay argues that retirement policies, including retirement income 
and healthcare sufficiency, should be crafted in light of demographic and 
lifestyle changes rather than as a means to solve a larger fiscal problem.  
The author studies work force demographics and life expectancy in the 
decades following WWII as compared to today and discusses how other 
nations have attempted to solve the same problems currently facing the 
United States.  As a means of addressing the increasing fiscal demands of 
paying for retirement, the article proposes an “omnibus” plan that extends 
the retirement age, introduces “means testing” for certain benefits as well 
as cutbacks and proposes changes to the taxable wage base.  
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Essay1 is an effort to establish a framework for action in 
dealing with the issues in a great debate that is not happening, but should 
be, about retirement, retirement policy and retirement income, and health 
care sufficiency.  Lots of ideas have been floated and much ink and paper, 
and many cyber impulses, expended, discussing various aspects of this set 
of issues but those ideas have typically been generated by reference to a 
single policy perspective, including most frequently national fiscal 
necessity, health care adequacy, or social security solvency.  This is 
                                                                                                                 
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Washington University School of 
Law. The author thanks Merton Bernstein, Jonathan M. Brand, Lucas Deppermann 
‘15, Carol A. Fichtelman, Richard L. Kaplan, Fred C. Little, Kathryn Moore, 
Robert Pollak, Spencer Reynolds ’14, Liz Sepper, and Peter Wiedenbeck for 
reading drafts of this paper and the participants in the spring 2013 Insurance Law 
Journal Symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law for listening to 
a speech setting forth the proposals made here. 
1 The word “Essay” is used intentionally to connote a looser style of 
argumentation and also fewer footnotes than conventional law review articles.  
Almost every sentence in this Essay could be footnoted to the mountain of 
technical material and the reams of commentary on this set of complex subjects.  
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essentially how the retirement proposals by the well-known Bowles-
Simpson Commission2 were generated as part of a larger proposal aimed at 
solving problems of national fiscal policy.  That set of proposals has 
languished for lots of reasons and this Essay will argue that the set of 
related retirement issues cannot be “solved” by reference to a set of 
proposals focused only on fiscal needs.  It is said that these retirement 
issues cannot be solved at all because they are too “political.”  The matters 
are obviously political (and politicians have difficulty solving big 
problems), but these matters also reflect deep changes in the underlying 
social order and in longevity that make changes in the relevant policies 
exceptionally difficult to resolve when looked at in a short-term political 
framework.  
 This Essay will review the following: 1) the shape of the various 
component retirement and health policies (and demographic facts) in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s as a reference point, 2) the policies in place 
right now (with imminent changes), and 3) a brief summary of related 
policies in Germany, Britain, Canada, and Singapore.  The Essay will then 
make an omnibus proposal not aimed primarily at solving the fiscal 
problem, but developed by reference largely to the changes in longevity 
and labor force participation.  This omnibus proposal would, however, if 
implemented, contribute to an amelioration of the fiscal problem.  
 
A. A NOTE ON STATISTICS AND PROJECTIONS 
 
 The arena of retirement and healthcare policies has a huge 
statistical component, but I will start with several cautionary notes about 
statistics in this area.  First, statistical projections that go very far into the 
future, say twenty years or more, are extraordinarily unreliable.  Mortality 
statistics are an exception, but projections of costs, etc. turn out frequently 
to be overstated.  When Medicare Part D was added during the presidency 
of George W. Bush, virtually all statistical projections were wrong on the 
high side.3 This was the case because no one was sure how adding drug 
                                                                                                                 
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM: THE 
MOMENT OF TRUTH, (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter BOWLES-SIMPSON]. 
3 See Edwin Park, Refuting, Once Again, the Medicare Part D Myth, OFF THE 
CHARTS BLOG: POLICY INSIGHT BEYOND THE NUMBERS, CENTER ON BUDGET AND 
POLICY PRIORITIES (March 11, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.offthechartsblog.org/  
refuting-once-again-the-medicare-part-d-myth-2/. 
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benefits would affect hospitalization and other costs.  In retrospect it seems 
to have reduced them (this is logical).  Second, human, social and economic 
behavior is dynamic and hard to predict.  For instance, many people believe 
that there will be (or is) a significant increase in delayed retirements due to 
the rise of retirement living costs (and longevity) and the failure of private 
savings and employer provided retirement income to increase 
commensurately (or at all).  Current data fails to show this because the 
current data can, due to exogenous factors, mask what is going on.  For 
instance, just as many people may wish to work longer, but we have had a 
major employment contraction with many attendant “early” retirements. 
These people are not retiring early because they wish to but because it was 
forced on them individually or in large groups.  Third, health care cost 
projections continue to be based on what has been a norm created during a 
period of sustained healthcare inflation (1965 to the present).  This inflation 
was fueled by massive resource infusions by employer plans and 
government transfer payments.  No one is predicting an end to this inflation 
in part because the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is slowly coming into 
effect and it will increase the demand for healthcare services.  But the rate 
of inflation has to change.  There literally will not be resources available to 
provide for health care at the quantities projected if the inflation continues 
at a very elevated level.  How it will come to an end is not yet understood, 
but it is beyond doubt going to end. 
 
I.  A LOOK BACK 
 
One of the problems in thinking about how to resolve the many 
pending “crises” in the areas of retirement and related retirement healthcare 
has been a failure to study methodically what has changed or led to our 
present situation.  Typically, it is assumed that the problems have sprung 
from: 1) increases in longevity and/or 2) government intervention in the 
health care market.  But the story is more complicated and multifaceted 
than these two phenomena, and in the next few paragraphs I will sketch our 
situation as of 1960, and then in the following section describe our situation 
today.  
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A. OASDI4   
 
The Social Security system is comprised of various benefits and it is 
widely assumed that these have not changed much and that the threat of 
insufficiency of funds today is a function of an aging workforce, lower 
birthrate, and increased longevity.  This is not true.  The primary insurance 
benefit (of OASDI) has changed in a number of ways since 1960.  First, the 
minimum benefits were much lower then.  Second, there were no 
automatic, only episodic, COLA (“Cost of Living Adjustment”) 
adjustments to benefits until 1972.  Third, there was no Social Security 
Disability Insurance scheme until 1956 and the number of participants had 
not ballooned as it did in the 1970s and 1990s.5  Fourth, since the wage 
base was lower the amount of higher end and maximum benefits were 
relatively smaller.  Fifth, a significant number of workers, including 
governmental, charitable, farm and ecclesiastical organization workers, 
were not included in the system.  The system was funded, as it is today, by 
a dual employer/employee tax on “wages and salaries” (without any offset 
for the various income tax deductions) that was intelligently premised on 
the notion that all people should at all times and all income levels put aside 
a portion of wages (matched by the employer) for support during old age.  
 
B. HEALTHCARE “SYSTEM”    
 
In 1960 there was no Medicare and no ACA.  A significant number of 
workers had employer- or union-provided health insurance but many did 
not.  A few people (usually wealthy) bought individual policies.  
Healthcare inflation had begun to increase as medicine modernized and 
began to add procedures and medications and machines that prolonged life 
or tested for sickness.  Healthcare insurance was a state matter. 
 
                                                                                                                 
4 This discussion of Social Security was informed by a recent, comprehensible 
and careful description of the system’s current provisions and its origins. Kathryn 
L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the 
Principles and Values it Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2011).  
5 See Disability Policy & History: Statement Before the H. Subcomm. on Soc. 
Security of the Comm. on Ways and Means (July 13, 2000) (statement of Edward 
D. Berkowitz). 
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C. LONGEVITY 
 
Longevity for males in 1960 was 66.6 years and for females was 73.1 
years.6 It was higher in developed European countries, but it had been 
creeping up in all developed nations during the post-World War II epoch, 
particularly for women.  
 
D. PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
Private employer and union plans covered approximately forty-one 
percent of the full time workforce in 1960.7 This group was largely male 
and had shorter life expectancies.  The pensions were generally defined 
benefit plans paying annuity type benefits that were set at retirement and 
generally did not increase automatically with inflation.  Defined 
contribution plans had become popular in the private (non-union) sector, 
but not in the case of public plans.  The rate of coverage of employees had 
increased from 1945 until 1960 significantly.  Private pension plans 
sometimes had disability insurance features that covered a disabled worker 
until he or she attained age sixty-five.  
 
E. LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
In 1960 83.3% of males aged sixteen to sixty-five participated in the 
labor force with females at 37.7%.8 Labor market participation immediately 
after age sixty-five by males was 35%.9 Employment was concentrated in 
full-time forty hour a week jobs reflecting the norms of the Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act, (supervisors, overtime, etc. etc.) devised to regulate 
industrial and other large employment employers.  To be sure, there were 
large numbers of small employers, and many rural employers, including 
                                                                                                                 
6 Health Data Interactive: Life Expectancy at Birth, 65 and 85 Years of Age, 
US, Selected Years 1900-2010, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS (Jun. 25, 
2013), http://205.207.175.93/HDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=169. 
7 S.A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 139 (1997).   
8 Current Population Survey Database, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2013) 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.txt.   
9 Robert S. Szafran, Age-Adjusted Labor Force Participation Rates, 1960-
2045, 123 MONTHLY LAB. REV.  25, 30 (2002).  
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farms, that existed outside the industrial model, but they were not a focus 
of federal regulation.    
 
F. MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
 
For employees or most employers there was a mandatory retirement 
age, generally age sixty-five.  There was no Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and, as mentioned above, not a large number 
of disabled workers.  Some employers, including police, fire, and the 
military provided for retirements typically before age sixty-five.  Colleges 
and universities typically had a mandatory retirement age for faculty, but 
occasionally it was somewhat higher than sixty-five.  
As we shall see shortly, the world shown by these facts is different, in 
significant ways, from the world our retirement programs now confronts. 
Most of the changes have added costs to these programs, so part of what 
this excursus into the past shows is that there are multiple contributing 
factors to our now heavy costs of retirement.  This suggests that no single 
change will alter the cost “crisis.”  
 
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
A. OASDI  
 
Today the primary insurance benefit is significantly higher than 
projected in 1960.  This is attributable to indexed increases, increases in 
minimum benefits, and increases in wages and salaries and the social 
security wage base.  The Social Security Trust Fund reserves, which are 
entirely composed of IOUs from the United States Treasury because all 
past and current FICA payments have been or will be expended by the 
Trustees, are being depleted, and the most recent data suggests that only 
about seventy-five percent of projected benefits are funded (counting future 
FICA taxes) and that the Social Security Trust Fund reserves will be 
exhausted in 2035.10 Early retirement (with reduced benefits) continues to 
                                                                                                                 
10 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORTS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS]. The 
exhaustion of the reserves does not mean there will be nothing to pay benefits for 
there will be a continuing accrual of future employment taxes and these taxes are 
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be available at age sixty-two, and normal retirement (depending on one’s 
birth date) is at sixty-six or sixty-seven.  Participants may elect to defer the 
regular commencement of benefits at this age, and if they do, their later 
benefits are increased by a set percentage.  The Social Security Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund is projected to be exhausted in 2016, and there has 
been a large increase11 both in those claiming and securing disability 
benefits, due in part to the employment contraction of the recent 
recession.12 There has been active discussion of this “crisis” and no action 
on a solution.  There seems to be consensus on a modest recalibration of 
the COLA (using a “chained” CPI versus the current CPI13) measuring 
point for the primary insurance amount but, even that has not yet been 
approved by Congress and the President.     
 
B. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
 
Medicare participants are eligible to enter at age sixty-five, whether 
retired or not.  (Disabled Social Security annuitants may qualify early in 
                                                                                                                 
projected to cover seventy-five percent of the projected future benefits if no 
changes are made.  
11 From 1998 to 2012 the number of disabled individuals receiving benefits 
increased from 4,698,319 to 8,853,614. Selected Data from Social Security’s 
Disability Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ 
STATS/dibStat.html. 
12 2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS, supra note 10. The Bowles-Simpson 
Commission made a suggestion that people “unable to work” but not disabled be 
permitted to receive an actuarially reduced payment of their primary insurance 
benefit at age sixty-two (augmented to 100% at their regular retirement date). One 
would be more sanguine about this proposal except for the history of difficulty in 
policing the definition of “disabled” under the current system. “Unable to work” is 
apparently a lower standard. BOWLES-SIMPSON supra note 2, at 51. It is worth 
noting that the Social Security Administration has been concerned, from the 
beginning of this benefit, about the administrability of the concept of disability. 
See Berkowitz, supra note 5. The parallel Railroad Retirement System has had 
similar, or even more difficulty, in assessing correctly disability status. See 
William K. Rashbaum, 600 Long Island Railroad Retirees Lose Disability Pay in 
U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A18.  
13 BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 51-2. Yale Sterling Professor of 
Economics, Robert J. Shiller, has recently proposed that social security benefits be 
indexed to GDP changes to align retirees’ interests with society’s as a whole. 
Robert J. Shiller, Want to Fix Social Security? Use the Right Wrench, N.Y. TIMES , 
June 8, 2013, at  4.     
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certain circumstances for Medicare.14) The costs of participation include: 1) 
substantial premium payments for Part B (physician and related services) 
and 2) in connection with the newer Part D certain payments.  Individuals 
commonly obtain wrap-around policies that in turn do not cover all of these 
costs.15 The Medicare Trust Fund’s (which technically only relates to Part 
A (hospitalization) of Medicare) reserves are projected to be exhausted 
sooner than the Social Security Trust Fund.  The wage base for this system 
is unlimited, unlike the one for OASDI, but the foreseeable tax revenues 
leave this system even more underfunded.16 Some Medicare eligible 
individuals are, due to their low income, also eligible for Medicaid.17 
Many employees are (before Medicare eligibility) covered by employer 
or union provided health insurance and a smaller number also have post-
retirement, employer-provided wrap-around (Medicare) coverage.  The 
passage of ACA in 2010 portends significant changes in (and an 
augmentation of) this, but at this time all of this seems dicey at best.18 The 
core feature of the augmentation, a series of state exchanges, seems in 
doubt.  The related expansion of Medicaid19 is on track in many states but 
has been rejected in other states.  The theory of a fully implemented ACA 
was that affordable near universal coverage would be obtained by 
collecting premiums from many young and relatively healthy people, but 
this theory has yet to be tested in the United States except in 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii.  There are predictions that many 
employers will drop their employer plans as ACA Exchange policies 
                                                                                                                 
14 Disability Planner: Medicare Coverage if You’re Disabled, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (2013), http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/dapproval4.htm.  
15 The relatively high costs and confusing structure of Medicare is well 
described in the companion piece to this article by Richard Kaplan. YOYO of 
course means, “you’re on your own,” an appropriate acronym for the current 
financial aspects of Medicare. Richard Kaplan, Desperate Retirees: The Perplexing 
Challenge of Covering Retirement Health Care Costs in a YOYO World, 20 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 433 (2014). 
16  2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS, supra note 10, at 3. 
17 Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid: Characteristics, 
Health Care Spending and Existing Policies, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44308. 
18 Susan E. Cancelosi, What to do, What to do: Employer Health Benefit Plans 
During and After 2012’s Uncertainty, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 569 (2013).  
19 Medicaid is a joint federal-state system that provides healthcare for 
individuals and families below a certain level of income. It has been steadily 
expanded but the states vary significantly in what is covered.  
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become available, and it is even clearer that many employers are already 
dropping employer provided wrap-around post-retirement plans (even 
though Medicare coverage and costs are not directly changed by the 
ACA).20 Finally, the CLASS (“Community Living Assistance Services and 
Support Act”) (or long term care) feature of ACA has been declared dead 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.21 
One of the major changes in the healthcare environment since 1960 is 
the widespread social perception that health care is a “right,” or an 
“entitlement,” and “someone” else should pay for it.  This perception 
extends to the feeling that insurers and employers, or Medicare, is, or are, 
greedy if they deny coverage for a therapy or an additional test or other 
medical procedures.  In the campaign around ACA the supporters never 
confronted this but in fact traded on it and the opponents only obliquely 
hinted that not all health care can, or will, be available under any system.  
Finally, healthcare inflation, while bending slightly down, remains high 
from almost any reference point.  New technology and insistent demands 
for, and provision of, experimental and other high-cost, or arguably 
duplicative procedures, continue to drive up cost.  
 
C. LONGEVITY  
 
In 2010, male life expectancy was seventy-six years and female was 
80.9 years.22 Many serious illnesses that were quickly fatal in 1960 are now 
managed over long periods of time, including cancer, heart disease, and 
dementia.  At the same time there is no reliable data that shows individuals 
are not “wearing out,” or physically declining, at a rate consistent with the 
recent past.  Finally, the CLASS ACT (a long term care program that 
proved fiscally unsound) of ACA, and its recent abandonment, reflects 
concern about what is thought to be a tsunami of baby boomers needing to 
be nursed for long periods of declining health in long term care facilities.  
This last prediction is one of the statistical projections that is hard to feel 
certain about.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
20  See generally Cancelosi, supra note 18. 
21 The Bowles-Simpson Commission had previously recommended its 
abandonment. BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 37. 
22  Health Data Interactive, supra note 6. 
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D. PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
In 2012 fifty-four percent of the civilian workforce participated in a 
public (non-Social Security), private, or union pension or other deferred 
compensation plan or plans.23 See Table I inset.  Compared to 1960 there 
has been a large scale change24 from guaranteed, defined benefit plans to 
§401(k) defined contribution plans which are likely to produce lower levels 
of lifetime contributions for retirement income purposes and ultimately 
lower benefits.25 See Figure 1 inset. Amounts accumulated in defined 
contribution plans can be rolled over into Individual Retirement Accounts 
(“IRAs”) which permit withdrawals for non-retirement purposes before 
retirement.26 Many §401(k) plans and IRAs have employee direction of 
investments which adds risk in many cases and also has produced high 
maintenance and investment advisor fees (which have produced litigation 
and some corrective rule-making).27  
About midway in the period from 1960 to the present the United States 
considered, but did not adopt, a minimum universal (employer paid for) 
pension (“MUPs”)28 designed to produce a higher level of private pension 
                                                                                                                 
23 Retirement Benefits: Access, participation, and take-up rate, civilian 
workers, National Compensation Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
(Mar. 2012), http://bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/civ_all.pdf (last 
visited June 25, 2013). 
24 This change has many causes but one of the leading ones has been the  
inflexible funding obligations and the massive funding deficiencies in many 
defined benefit plans. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Ratings Service Finds 
Pension Shortfall, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at B1 (Moody’s recomputes state 
and local pension liabilities showing larger deficiencies in a number of states). 
25 There is no good data for 1960 because the Labor Department was not yet 
charged with regulating deferred compensation plans but data from the passage of 
ERISA in 1974 to the present shows the dramatic move to §401(k) plans. See, e.g., 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Defined Contribution Plans: Method of Contribution, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://bls.gov/ncs/eba/detailedprovisions/2010/ 
ownership/private/table20a.txt (viewed on June 25, 2013). Currently eighty-six 
percent of those who participate in a defined contribution plan participate in a 
§401(k) (perhaps alongside another defined contribution plan in some cases).  
26 26 U.S.C.A. §§72 (t)(6), (7), (8) and 408 (d). 
27 See Tara Siegel Bernard, Limiting the 401(k) Finder’s Fee, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2013, at B1.  
28 See P. WIEDENBECK & R. OSGOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS 84 (2d ed. 2013). MUPs were recommended by the President’s 
Commission on Pension Policy in 1981.  
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plan benefits to a larger number of workers, particularly the low paid. 
While a few other developed countries have done this, there was no 
political support for this expensive idea that would have loaded another 
expense on employment.  
The confluence of the decline of regular pension plans and the rise of 
the highly discretionary §401(k) plans will likely cause private pensions to 
recede as a percentage contributor to retirement income.  This can be 
attributed to a number of factors, including the ferocious legal complexity 
of this area of the law and the need on the part of employer to reduce 
employment related costs as the social insurance costs of social security 
and health care have risen dramatically.  Private plans are voluntary and 
inflexible and in the environment of oscillating economic growth they are 
disfavored. 
FIGURE 1:29 
 
 
Y axis = number of plans 
 
                                                                                                                 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and 
Graphs 25 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historical 
tables.pdf. 
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Table 1. Retirement Benefits: Access, participation, and take-up 
rates, civilian workers, National Compensation Survey, March 
201230 
 
 
E. LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
EMPLOYMENT  
 
Women have tremendously increased their participation in the labor 
force (37.7% to 58.6%)31 while male participation remains at historic 
                                                                                                                 
30 Retirement Benefits, supra note 23. 
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levels.  Participation by the elderly (sixty-five or older) is rising 
significantly (currently 18.5%) after a drop to an all-time low in the mid-
1980s (11%) but due to the employment contraction of the recent recession 
it is hard to be sure how much of the current rise is permanent,32 (see 
Figure 2 inset).33 Labor force participation by younger people has dropped 
recently to 54.9% in 2012 due to high levels of post-high school 
educational enrollment and also the depth of the recession of 2007-09.34  
An equally significant set of changes seems to be occurring in the 
structure of employment.  The industrial (and FLSA) model of full work 
weeks, a single employer, supervisors, and overtime is changing.  As in the 
18th century,35 it now looks like more people are working at home, holding 
multiple jobs simultaneously, not working forty hours a week for any 
single employer, and changing employers more frequently.  See Figure 3 
inset on the rise of regular part-time employment.  Some of these changes 
may reflect profit-maximizing employers shifting to short-term contract 
labor (to avoid regulatory and health care costs), but they also reflect the 
effect of new technologies on the place and nature of employment.  These 
trends seem likely to continue and perhaps even to accelerate.  
 
F. MANDATORY RETIREMENT  
 
In 1986 Congress passed and President Reagan signed an amendment 
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) banning 
mandatory retirement for virtually all employees.36 This change, when 
added to the increased costs of retirement and changes in labor force 
participation by women and heavy immigration, have added significantly to 
                                                                                                                 
31 See Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Participation: 75 years of 
change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (Dec. 1999). 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 See id.  
34 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Projections to 2022: The Labor 
Force Participation Rate Continues to Fall, MONTHLY LAB. REV.  1, 12, 18 (Dec. 
2013). 
35 See generally ROY PORTER, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE 18TH CENTURY 185-
213 (Rev. ed. 1991); T.C.W. BLANNING, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: EUROPE 
1688-1815, 91-130 (2000) (Europe). As to our current situation, see Editorial, 
Part-Time America, WALL STREET J., July 7, 2013, at A12.   
36 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).  
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the labor force37 and created a significant downdraft on wages and 
salaries.38  
 
FIGURE 2:  Labor Force Participation Rate – 65 years and over39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
37 Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15, 20, 25-27 (May 2002). 
38 Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Shierholz, A Decade of Flat Wages: The Key 
Barrier to Shared Prosperity and a Rising Middle Class, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
BRIEFING PAPER 365, Aug. 21, 2013, at 3, available at 
http://s1.epi.org/files/2013/BP365.pdf. 
39 Fullerton, supra note 31, at 3-4.  
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FIGURE 3:  Employed part time40 
 
 
 
III. COMPARATIVE RETIREMENT AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 
 
Table II41 inset in the text, compares the health and retirement policies 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and 
                                                                                                                 
40 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS: SUMMARY 
08-08 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils71.pdf. 
41   This chart is constructed from information gleaned from a number of law 
review articles about the foreign nations’ systems. See Steven Ney, Pension 
Reform in Germany (ICCR Vienna/PEN-REF Project, Feb. 2001); Lillian Liu, 
Retirement Income Security in the United Kingdom, 62 SOC. SEC. BULL., no.1, at  
24, 26, 27, 29 (1999); Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the 
British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, no.1, at 25, 29 (2003) (United 
Kingdom’s universal health care program); United Kingdom, Retirement Age, 
GOV.UK (last updated Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/retirement-age; Michael 
Wiseman & Martynas Yčas, The Canadian Safety Net for the Elderly, 68 SOC. SEC. 
BULL, no. 2, at 55, 56, 64 (2008); DAVID MCCARTHY ET AL., ASSET RICH AND 
CASH POOR: RETIREMENT PROVISION AND HOUSING  POLICY IN SINGAPORE   3, 4, 
5, 9, 28 (2001), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/APCITY/UNPAN018299.pdf. It is worth noting that the rates and the 
base of taxation for social insurance benefits are and have been quite variable 
among these and other countries. (United States: employee (7.3%), employer 
(7.3%); Germany: employee (17.3%), employer (17.3%); Canada: employee 
(6.2%), employer (10.5%)). International Comparisons of Charitable Giving 
November 2006, CAF BRIEFING PAPER (CAF), 9 (2006). http://www.cafonline.org/ 
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Singapore.  Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, like the United 
States, have an aging workforce and face significant fiscal challenges in 
paying for the obligations of their health and retirement benefits.  At the 
same time each of the foreign nations is funding supplemental retirement 
income (in various ways) at higher levels than the United States.  They 
have not experienced such high health care inflation and all cap or ration 
health coverage in ways that has led to significant use by citizens who are 
using private alternative systems while employed or after retirement. 
Germany alone retains a mandatory retirement age of sixty-seven.  
Germany’s primary social security retirement benefits are more variable 
than the United States, and depending on income and other factors, but all 
of these nations use general revenues to support the basic social security 
system at least in part.  In sum, these systems will likely produce, if 
solvent, a higher level of retirement income and lower health care costs for 
retirees. 
The comparative chart shows, however, that there is no quick, unitary 
or easy solution to the United States’ multiple “crises” for it demonstrates 
the significant parallels in the approaches of the five nations.  To the extent 
that there are parallels, the chart also fails to demonstrate the major 
challenges that they face in common which is that as life expectancy 
increases, the likelihood that a national economy will generate enough 
“surplus” labor income to fund thirty years of retirement (and all health 
costs for a lifetime) after only forty-plus years of covered employment is 
low. More workers will need to work beyond age sixty-five to ensure the 
solvency of these promises.  Finally, the increase in longevity when 
coupled with the fracturing of employment into smaller and less stable 
components requires a re-conceptualization of how to amass sufficient 
retirement resources for the population.  
                                                                                                                 
PDF/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
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TABLE II: Pension, Retirement Age & Health Coverage Comparison 
 United States United Kingdom Canada Germany Singapore 
Basic S/S 
Retireme
nt 
System 
Yes 
 
Employer/Employee 
Contribution 
National Insurance
Fund 
 
(Based on years of 
contribution) 
Employer/Employe
e/ State Funded 
Old Age 
Support 
(OAS) 
 
Employer/E
mployee/ 
State Funded, 
Flat Rate 
GRV 
Employer/Emplo
yee/ 
State Funded 
Central 
Pension 
Fund (CPF) 
 
Multiple 
Distinct 
Accounts 
 
Employer/Emp
loyee 
Funded 
Mandato
ry 
Suppleme
ntal 
Retireme
nt System 
No Second State 
Pension 
(SSP or S2P) 
 
Earnings-related 
Redistributive 
Mandatory 
CPP/QPP 
 
Earnings-
related 
Employer/E
mployee 
Contributions 
Not Mandatory 
 
Supplemental 
Employer-run, 
Defined-benefit 
Not 
Mandatory 
Voluntar
y 
Suppleme
ntal 
Retireme
nt Option 
(Employe
r) 
Yes 
 
Moving to 401(k) 
Employer/Employee 
Yes 
 
Tax Incentives 
Yes 
 
Tax 
Incentives 
Yes 
 
Employer-
funded More 
Emphasis on this
as GRV 
weakens 
Yes 
 
Voluntary SRS 
Tax Incentives 
Ma
ndat
ory 
Retire
ment 
Age 
No No after 2011 No 
 
65 Can Be 
NRA under 
OAS and 
CPP/QPP 
Yes, age 67 
(Rest of EU is 
65) 
No 
 
Minimum 
Age: 62 
Health 
Coverage 
Before Age 65: 
Private 
Employer Ins. 
& ACA—2014 
Age 65+: Medicare 
State Provided State 
Mandated 
State Insurance 
Mandate 
Yes 
 
Under CPF 
 
IV.  AN OMNIBUS PROPOSAL 
 
All recent efforts to reform or alter the various retirement and 
healthcare provisions relating to older Americans have failed.  The last 
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successful set of changes occurred during Ronald Reagan’s presidency 
when in 1983, on a bipartisan basis, Congress and the President agreed to 
move the OASDI full retirement eligibility age from sixty-five to sixty-six 
and finally to sixty-seven.42 No change was made in the early retirement 
age (sixty-two) or in the year of Medicare eligibility.  During George W. 
Bush’s presidency he proposed making a portion of a person’s OASDI 
contributions be eligible to be invested in actual external (to the 
Government) investment vehicles.43 Politicians derided and rejected this 
idea, but a number of our developed peers, including the United Kingdom 
and Singapore, have adopted a feature like this or are actively considering 
it.  
 In the following paragraphs, labeled as in the discussion above, I 
will make a set of linked proposals that are designed to deal with an aging 
and expanded workforce, fiscal deterioration of both OASDI and Medicare, 
the absence of a norm of retirement, changes in the structure of work, and 
health care developments.  The overall theory of the proposals is that 
individuals and the governments are not able to amass enough resources to 
pay for elongated retirements and people should work beyond the 
conventional retirement age of sixty-five to contribute to the labor force 
and for continuing professional stimulation.   
  
A. OASDI  
 
The year for retirement eligibility with full benefits should be moved 
gradually to age seventy.  Bowles-Simpson also proposed an increase in the 
regular and early retirement ages for the primary benefit eligibility, but this 
was couched in terms of making that system, and the entire federal 
government, more solvent.44 This was not an adequate reason for most 
                                                                                                                 
42 Janice M. Gregory et al., Strengthening Social Security for the Long Run, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS.: SOC. SEC. BRIEF, no. 35, Nov. 2010, at 3,4. 
43 Elizabeth D. Tedrow, Social Security Privatization In Other Countries – 
What Lessons Can Be Learned For the United States?, 14 ELDER L.J. 35, 36, 39 
(2006); see also Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided 
Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131, 148-50 (privatization entails investing funds in 
non-governmental entities). 
44 BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 50. A commission chaired by then Sen. 
Kerrey of Nebraska recommended in 1995 delaying further the full retirement 
eligibility age but not the early retirement age. J. ROBERT KERREY & JOHN C. 
DANFORTH, Reform Proposal of Commissioners, in BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON 
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people. Why? A primary cause of the parlousness of the Social Security, 
Disability and Medicare Trust Funds has been Congress’s penchant for 
liberalizing benefits without paying for them.  The payroll taxes and the 
wage base have increased but in each case not enough to finance the 
addition of COLAs, larger minimum benefits, and the disability income 
feature and program.  It is true that the aging of the workforce and the drop 
in the birthrate45 have also contributed to this situation, but the trust funds 
(except the Disability Insurance Trust Fund) would have years of solvency 
ahead of them without the congressional giveaways. 
  The only convincing reason to delay for three years (to age 
seventy) the year for full retirement eligibility is that the population is 
living longer and is healthier.  These changes mean that if the average 
person goes to work at, say, age twenty and retires at sixty-four, he or she 
has forty-five years to accumulate resources (in government solution and in 
various qualified and non-qualified savings vehicles) for a likely retirement 
period of twenty five years (or more if the couple is married).  The 
elongated period of retirement requires more working and productive years 
to save adequately and also to contribute to the mandatory government 
plans (OASDI and Medicare).  
 Four additional changes should also be considered.  First, the early 
retirement age of sixty-two should be raised (probably to age sixty-five) 
because the pre-retirement age should parallel the full retirement age and 
also the discounted (from age seventy to age sixty-two) primary retirement 
benefit would be too small.  Second, for retirees in the top income46 
quartiles (say $250,000 or more) the portion of the primary retirement 
benefit attributable to employer contributions and the income on them 
(logically fifty percent) should be means tested.  Some resist this on the 
ground that it is a breach of the OASDI “social contract” but Congress’ 
many liberalizations of that system eliminated any implied promise of 
noninterference with the equilibrium (which never existed) of sufficiency.  
If the breach argument was convincing, then the change could be 
                                                                                                                 
ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 7, 16 (Dec. 
1994). 
45 Mark Mather, World Population Data Sheet 2012: Fact Sheet: The Decline 
in U.S. Fertility, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (July 2012), 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2012/world-population-data-sheet/ 
fact-sheet-us-population.aspx. 
46 The figure used for these purposes should not be federal taxable income but 
a more robust computation of income including exempt municipal bond interest.  
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prospective in effect, but intellectually it is not convincing because the 
employer contributions are mandated and could be applied logically to 
anyone’s primary retirement benefit.  Third, the previously eliminated 
earnings test set at a high level for workers who work beyond the age of 
primary retirement benefit eligibility (to be age seventy) and are receiving 
benefits should be reinstated.47 Fourth, the cutback of benefits (currently 
5/9% for each month before full retirement eligibility that one retires early) 
applicable to those who commence benefits between ages sixty-five and 
seventy should be modestly reduced.48 Delayed retirement increases the 
monthly retirement pension, when taken, by eight percent for a year’s delay 
or 2/3% per month of delay (for those with birthdays in or after 1943) up to 
retirement at age seventy.  The eight percent figure should be reduced 
modestly as part of the system-wide belt-tightening proposed here.49 This 
reflects the fact that the labor market is less stable than before and older 
workers will likely find it harder to find new employment during this 
period.  Such a modification of the cutback should also take some pressure 
off of the disability income fund.  This reduction in the cutback is 
obviously something that will “add” cost but the fact that it is part of a 
further pushing back of the age of full retirement eligibility indicates that it 
                                                                                                                 
47 This test was eliminated in 2000 for individuals who have attained their 
normal retirement age. Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-182, 114 Stat. 198 (2000); see Office of the Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
Automatic Determinations: Exempt Amounts, 1975-1999, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/rteahistory.html (last modified Oct. 16. 2008). 
48 The current actuarial reduction (5/9% per month) is said to be actuarially 
“fair” and my proposal would depart from that standard (at some cost to the trust 
fund) by reducing it to say 5/12% per month. This is justifiable taking into account 
the various equities of this delay in benefit commencement and the variability of 
the health of people over age sixty-five. 
49 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement Planner: Delayed Retirement Credits 
http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/delayret.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“social 
security benefits are increased by a certain percentage (depending on date of birth) 
if you delay your retirement beyond full retirement age”); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
Summary of P.L. 98-21, (H.R. 1900) Social Security Administration Amendments 
of 1983 – Signed on April 20, 1983, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, IN-DEPTH RESEARCH, 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1983amend.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (Act 
increases delayed retirement credit). 
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is really a softening of that decision.50 Fifth, there are a plethora of 
proposals to increase the taxable wage base to include up to ninety percent 
of all wages and salaries or even investment or capital gains income.51 The 
historic reason for limited social security taxation of wages or salaries is 
that the primary insurance benefit is intended as a jointly funded employee 
pension.  However, since some people, in effect, earn investment income as 
their self-employment income, it seems appropriate to include an amount of 
investment income above say $30,000 and below the current social security 
wage base as analogous to salary or wage income.  
 There will be some who will condemn any further delaying of 
primary retirement eligibility.  In an editorial52 entitled “What’s Next for 
Social Security?” published on June 9, 2013 the New York Times lambasted 
the “cuts” already taking place in Social Security.  It specifically referred to 
the delay from age sixty-five to sixty-seven as a “cut”.  The Times opined 
that Social Security “benefit cuts…cannot go much further.”  Putting aside 
the Times’ current tendency for rhetorical excess, the editorial is an 
example of how difficult it is to discuss social security when ad hominen 
statements that ignore the many changes that have liberalized benefits 
decry other changes that slow or defer benefits.  The full truth as to whether 
any “cuts” are taking place would have to take into account that if the 
social security regime of the fairly recent past was in effect, many of the 
people (who are now working beyond age sixty-five) would have lost (due 
to the very low earnings test) their entire benefit without having the option 
of deferring commencement and increasing it.  A further system-wide 
                                                                                                                 
50 This would also be consistent with the Bowles-Simpson proposal to allow 
greater benefits to those who are unable to work after age sixty-five but not 
disabled within the meaning of the law. BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 50-51. 
51  In 2005 (due to growth in income equality) only eighty-five percent of 
wages and salaries, were taxable for FICA purposes. Proposals to tax one hundred 
percent of wages and salaries would, if implemented, significantly delay the 
exhaustion of the Social Security trust fund (for up to forty more years if benefits 
are not similarly increased) but they have not been legislatively feasible due to a 
disagreement over whether the benefits of the high-income earners should be 
increased in a parallel fashion.  An increase of both taxable wages and benefits 
would retain the historic character of the system but be less fiscally positive. See 
JANEMARIE MULVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32896, SOCIAL SECURITY: 
RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE TAXABLE EARNINGS BASE, at 1-3 (Sept. 24, 2010). 
52 Editorial, What’s Next for Social Security?, N.Y TIMES, June 9, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/whats-next-for-social-
security.html?_r=0. 
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deferral of benefits is obviously a serious move that should not be 
undertaken lightly, but the increase in longevity coupled with past benefit 
liberalizations since 1960 justifies a revision of the current rules contrary to 
the Times editorial.  
 It is possible that one might see the proposal to establish a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy as in tension with the overall 
conclusion that people can, and should, for societal and for individual 
reasons, work beyond age sixty-give.  This perception misses the fact that 
the change in the social security eligibility age for primary retirement 
benefits from sixty-five to seventy will constitute a powerful incentive to 
work until age seventy for most people in the workforce.  That incentive is 
appropriately limited to working until age seventy. After age seventy 
individual health considerations and society’s interest in accommodating 
young labor force entrants suggests the advisability of a mandatory 
retirement option for employers.  As mentioned above, no employer would 
be required to adopt such a mandatory retirement rule but many would, 
particularly if the demographic trend of people seeking to work beyond age 
sixty-five continues or increases. 
 Under current labor title pension and federal income tax law, a 
qualified plan may, in some cases, set a normal retirement date under the 
age of sixty-five.53 Such a plan provision does not mean that a participant 
must retire at age sixty-five but it does trigger (usually) possible benefit 
distribution eligibility, vests any unvested benefits, and a few other things. 
 It is possible that this private pension age sixty-five option should 
be rethought in light of the other proposals made here, if adopted.  At the 
same time it is not necessary to change this now and in view of the increase 
in instability of employment particularly for older workers, it should not be 
changed simultaneously but it should be looked at again after a period of 
time has passed for the other changes to settle in.   
  
B. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM  
 
In line with the proposal on moving full primary retirement benefit 
eligibility to age seventy, it would seem logical to gradually, and over time, 
move full Medicare eligibility to age seventy also.  Those between ages 
sixty-five and seventy would be covered, if they come into effect fully, by 
the provisions of ACA including in some cases continuing employer-
provided healthcare.  This ACA coverage begins to address the large issues 
                                                                                                                 
53 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(8) (2006). 
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coming to the fore as a result of the change in the structure of employment 
and also the difficulties of those losing coverage employed later in life due 
to industrial dislocations and/or a significant recession.  The changes in 
eligibility will bring extra revenues to the Trust funds but likely increase 
ACA costs (when they are honestly calculated).  It would almost certainly 
increase the cost of Medicaid.  It is not clear, given the prior commitment 
to ACA, as febrile as it is, that this change will affect healthcare inflation.  
It might, in fact, increase it a bit by taking five years out of the Medicare 
(low fee) system and putting it in the higher fee insurance and less high fee 
(Medicaid) system.  
 This change in the Medicare eligibility age will help retirees in that 
it delays for five years entry into the confusing, multiple fee, and 
compartmentalized Medicare system, a system that provides low payments 
to providers, few incentives to economize, and absurdly pays the most to 
the highest cost providers without regard to outcomes.  But all of these 
problems with Medicare would better be handled by moving it either to be 
a unified state-controlled system or to a system in which providers and 
insurers have to compete to win contracts to provide services to 
beneficiaries.  The beneficiaries currently have no motive to diminish 
expenses and the government has devised a Rube Goldberg system 
comprised of components only fit to be understood as a rolling steel ball 
sculpture in an airport waiting room.  
 
C. PRIVATE PENSIONS  
 
It is not clear that this omnibus proposal will lead to any increase in 
the costs (or change the viability) of private or other governmental pension 
or §401(k) plans.  At the same time Congress should reconsider the ease of 
making early withdrawals from all such plans for any but the most worthy 
purposes.54 Why should the assets of a §401(k) account, if rolled over into 
an IRA, be withdrawable to buy a new or larger home or to send a child to 
college when, in general, people are not saving adequately for retirement? 
Other related changes could be made to refocus qualified plan treatment on 
                                                                                                                 
54 Dan Halperin, among others, has endorsed limitations on the allowable 
reasons for distributions. See infra note 54-58 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 
Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual 
Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 283, 293-303 (1999). 
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retirement needs.  Why should Roth IRA’s even exist?55 Why should roll-
over distributions from IRAs to charities permanently escape income tax?56 
 Daniel Halperin has made a series of thoughtful proposals (divided 
into “ideal” and “possible” categories) to improve the retirement income of 
lower paid57 people participating in qualified plans.58 He proposes changes 
in the coverage and substantiality of benefits of the low paid, including full 
and immediate eligibility and vesting.59 He also suggests that employees 
should be protected against market declines in their accounts in defined 
contribution plans.60 He admits that all or most of his “ideal” proposals 
would discourage adoption or even trigger terminations of such qualified 
plans.61 In sum, his proposals resemble the MUPs62 proposal which never 
was adopted or even widely supported.  
Halperin’s proposals are particularly unlikely to be adopted when 
the social security system itself is underfunded in the longer term.  The 
most sensible set of changes to the qualified plan rules would be those 
which facilitate less complex alternatives like the SEP-IRA option or a 
Simplified Retirement Plan (“SIMPLE” Plan) which allows employers to 
adopt a plan composed of linked IRAs for each employee and then perhaps 
to add a governmental match contribution for certain low paid workers.63 
                                                                                                                 
55 See id. at 303-04 (a Roth IRA does not require lifetime distributions, which 
“undercuts the very notion that it is a retirement funding vehicle at all.”). 
56 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(8)(E) denies a charitable deduction of any such amount 
if excluded from the income of the participant. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(8) 
for this extraordinary loophole from the tax base. 
57 It is important to note that these changes could potentially advantage very 
wealthy people who have never earned wages or salaries and hence have low or 
even the minimum social security primary insurance benefit.  
58 Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income – The Ideal, the 
Possible and the Reality, 11 ELDER L. J. 37 (2003). 
59 See also Russell K. Osgood, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan 
Vesting: Revolution Not Reform, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 452 (1978) (calling for full and 
immediate vesting for all private pension plan participants). 
60 Halperin, supra note 58, at 45. 
61 Id. at 67. 
62 MUPs (“Minimum Universal [Private] Pension”) were proposed by the 
President Commission on Pension Policy in 1981 as a way to increase for all 
people retirement income by mandating universal private pension coverage. See 
WIEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 28, at 84.   
63  In 1983 Congress added SEPs (“Simplified Employee Pensions” which are 
company-wide employee linked IRAs) in I.R.C. § 408(k) (2006). SEPs have not 
been widely adopted perhaps because of Congress’ nearly simultaneous creation 
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This alternative would also create a vehicle (each IRA) that would be fully 
portable and that would permit contribution during periods of unstable, 
part-time employment or for several part-time employers, a trend that is 
occurring. 
 
D. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE 
 
 To help employers deal with increased costs of some of this 
proposal, Congress should amend ADEA to permit an employer (including 
the government) to impose a mandatory retirement age of seventy.  Many 
employers, particularly colleges and universities, struggle with the 
propensity of some faculty and other highly paid workers to stay on beyond 
seventy.  Many of these people are capable of performing their jobs but 
some are not, and a majority has experienced some diminution of 
productivity.  
 Allowing a mandatory retirement age of seventy helps address the 
problem of the lack of skilled jobs for new entrants to the labor force.  It 
also would remove, for electing employers, the cost and anguish of dealing 
with the weakening but not yet fully debilitated employee.  Finally, 
allowing an employer to do this would not coerce them to do it (consistent 
with pre-ADEA law and practice).  
 The only significant objection to allowing a mandatory retirement 
age is that most people already retire at or before age seventy64 and it is not 
clear whether this change will save employers much or do much for labor 
market flexibility.  But, going back to the unreliability of statistical 
projections, we are only at the beginning of the changes (in employee 
behavior at age sixty-five) that might come as economic needs grow and 
the propensity to retire after sixty-five changes dramatically.  
                                                                                                                 
and favoring (in many ways) of the even more flexible § 401(k) alternative. I.R.C. 
§ 401(k). Most recently the Simplified Retirement Plan (SIMPLE plan) was added 
in 1996 and can be in the form of a SEP or a § 401(k) plan. See WIEDENBECK & 
OSGOOD, supra note 28, at 382–91.   
64 It is hard to establish this, but it can be shown by looking at the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Data on Labor Force Participation at age 70 and beyond; for 
instance, labor force participation, while growing for those aged 70 to 74 is about 
19%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2013), available at http://www.bls. 
gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm. 
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 Some will object to the notion that there is no human right to work 
beyond age seventy but the European Court of Justice has held that the 
Union’s Human Rights Convention and related directives of the European 
Council validly permit mandatory retirement at age sixty-five and the 
Germans still permit it, but at age sixty-seven.65 Reinstatement of the 
possibility of a mandatory retirement age would not prohibit anyone from 
working beyond age seventy but it would permit electing employers to end 
employment in those enterprises or entities at age seventy.  If an employer 
thinks that is not justifiable then it does not have to elect to impose a 
mandatory retirement age.  It would be important in crafting the repeal of 
the current ADEA rule to ensure that employers could be given flexibility 
to phase down on a non-discriminatory basis an employee’s employment 
starting at age seventy (or perhaps a little sooner) as long as employment 
continues for a reasonably short period of time after age seventy, say, no 
more than a five-year phase down.  This would also fit with the changes 
occurring in the structure of employment and not require employers to 
forfeit suddenly all of the accrued experience of employees attaining age 
seventy. 
 Finally, this change in mandatory retirement contributes to the 
creation of a coherent and sensible set of policies for employees, 
employers, and the government.  Age seventy would be the target for 
retirement for all purposes.  One possible addition to this proposal might be 
to impose an additional employer payroll tax of say one percent on the 
wages of any employee who works beyond age seventy.  This tax would be 
collected and split between the Medicare and Social Security trust funds. 
Why impose it on the wages of those who work over age seventy?  Because 
this reinforces the goal of retirement at seventy.  Alternatively or perhaps 
additionally, employers who impose a mandatory retirement age of age 
seventy could be required to contribute an additional amount to a mandated 
private pension fund for all of its qualifying employees (a form of MUPs) 
for the privilege of mandatory retirement.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
65 See Case C-388/07, The Queen v. Sec’y of State, 2009 E.C.R. I-01569, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
62007CJ0388:EN:HTML; Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortifiel 
Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R I-8531, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 62005CJ0411:EN:HTML. 
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E. LABOR MARKET AND STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 I have argued that the changes we are seeing in the structure of 
employment may well accelerate and certainly will continue.  This should 
be watched closely for it would seem that the employment tax model, 
relying on taxes on wages and salaries for both Medicare and OASDI, may 
need to be reconsidered in light of these changes.  Wages and salaries, the 
current wage base, presuppose conventional, industrial model employment, 
not piece work or independent employment based in the home.  They were 
conceived in a world in which an employee had only one employer.  The 
entire structure of the employment tax trust funds are derivative of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) which again is premised on an 
employee having only one employer.  In a world in which people might 
work for a number of employers on a part-time basis, the FLSA rules about 
over-time, supervision, etc., are outmoded and may, in fact, encourage 
unrelated employers to use even more part-time workers.66   
 There has been a fair amount of anguish, by commentators67 and 
the Labor Department68, about the move to episodic, multiple part-time 
employment.  It certainly has a negative financial impact for many workers, 
but the old norm of sustained very long-term employment by a single large 
employer did not frequently produce long-term satisfaction on the part of 
workers.  Very long-term employment can produce stagnation on the part 
                                                                                                                 
66  In recent years the Labor Department has fought valiantly to police the line 
between true “independent” contractors and part-time employees called 
independent contractors. See Susan N. Houseman,  A Report on Temporary Help, 
On-Call, Direct-Hire, Temporary, Leased, Contract Company, and Independent 
Contractor Employment in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 1999), 
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/herman/reports/futurework/conferenc
e/staffing/exec_s.htm.  
67 See generally Julia J. Bartkowiak, Trends Toward Part-Time Employment: 
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of the employer and its cadre of employees.  Of course, this was not always 
the case but economic changes beginning in the 1980s are not reversible 
and those changes require enterprises to be more nimble in hiring 
employees (and in making major capital investments) and require 
employees to be more aggressive in seeking out multiple, sometimes 
simultaneous work opportunities.      
 
V.  SUMMATION AND FEASIBILITY 
 
I have argued in this Essay that the problems with our retirement and 
health policies for the aging are so deep and the politics so heavy, that the 
only solution that might succeed is an omnibus solution devised in light of 
the long-term trends in employment, longevity, and the nature of 
employment or work.  The proposals that I have made require contributions 
by employees in the form of more work and possibly diminished benefits 
and by employers of potentially additional years of healthcare premiums 
and retirement plan contributions all aimed at creating a retirement norm of 
age seventy.  This is a reasonable proposal and one that will help both the 
OASDI and the Medicare trust funds.  
A great uncertainty in the foregoing is the future of ACA.  It certainly 
rests on a foundation of sand that the ocean of events is eroding.  On the 
other hand, the changes in the structure of employment suggest that 
healthcare coverage needs to be decoupled from the model of the large 
employer providing employees (and their families) healthcare coverage.  
ACA is a move in that direction, but it may not survive after coming out of 
the regulatory incubator it was placed in when it was crafted legislatively.  
If it does not survive, however, the combination of the social sense of 
healthcare entitlement along with the changes in the structure of 
employment will dictate some way to provide additional, affordable health 
care coverage that eliminates exclusions based on age, pre-existing 
conditions, or employment status.   
In sum, I propose that in light of major demographic changes, 
including increased labor force participation, increased longevity, and the 
absence of adequate retirement saving, we should gradually move primary 
social security retirement to age seventy, increase the age of Medicare 
entry also to age seventy, permit optional (with the employer) mandatory 
retirement at age seventy, and make a number of smaller changes designed 
to soften the effects of these changes.  Workers now seem to wish (or feel 
the need) to work beyond age sixty-five and this additional period of work 
will improve the financial viability of the two trust funds.  In the longer run 
additional retirement savings are needed either in the form of additional 
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non-social security employer retirement plan contributions or amounts in 
other tax-favored retirement vehicles external to the employment 
relationship.  Finally, these changes do not address in a systematic way the 
developments in the structure and nature of employment.  Perhaps the 
current range of tax favored structures, modified by moving to more 
portable and employee focused retirement savings accounts rather than 
qualified plans, can accommodate this change but that is not at all sure. 
 
